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Abstract 
How do we assign causal responsibility for others’ 
decisions? The present experiments examine the possibility 
that an optimality constraint is used in these attributions, 
with agents considered less responsible for outcomes when 
the decisions that led to those outcomes were suboptimal. 
Our first two experiments investigate scenarios in which 
agents are choosing among multiple options, varying the 
efficacy of the forsaken alternatives to examine the role of 
optimality in attributing responsibility. Experiment 3 tests 
whether optimality considerations also play a role in 
attribution of causality more generally. Taken together, 
these studies indicate that optimality constraints are used in 
lay decision theory and in causal judgment. 
Keywords: Causal attribution; decision-making; theory of 
mind; responsibility; lay decision theory. 
Introduction 
Many of the decisions we make on a daily basis are 
thoroughly mediocre. This conclusion has been the joint 
product of the philosophical discipline of Decision 
Theory, which aims to characterize the decisions we 
ought to make given our knowledge and priorities (e.g., 
Jeffrey, 1965), and the psychological discipline of 
Judgment and Decision-Making (JDM), which aims to 
characterize actual decision-making behavior (e.g., 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). JDM research has shown 
that normative decision theory largely fails as a 
descriptive theory of human decision-making, 
documenting a plethora of ways in which our actual 
decision-making does not live up to normative standards. 
Less is known, however, about how people 
conceptualize and evaluate the decisions of others—a 
research question one might term lay decision theory. The 
present research begins to examine this question, 
investigating how people assign causal responsibility to 
agents for the outcomes of their decisions. 
In these experiments, we consider situations in which 
an agent made a decision that led to an outcome with 
probability PACT (always 50%), but could have made an 
alternative decision that would have led to that outcome 
with probability PALT (which was varied between 10% 
and 90% across conditions). For example: 
Angie has a shrub, and wants the shrub’s flowers to 
turn red. She is considering two brands of fertilizer 
to apply: 
If she applies Formula PTY, there is a 50% chance 
that the flowers will turn red. 
If she applies Formula NRW, there is a 10% chance 
that the flowers will turn red. 
Angie chooses Formula PTY, and the flowers turn red. 
Thus, Angie’s actual choice of Formula PTY led to the 
outcome with probability PACT = 50%, and her alternative 
choice of Formula NRW led to the outcome with PALT = 
10%. Because PACT > PALT, Angie’s choice was optimal. 
However, if Formula NRW had led to the outcome with 
PALT = 90%, then PALT > PACT, and Angie’s choice would 
have been suboptimal. Finally, if PALT had been 50%, then 
PACT = PALT, and there would have been no uniquely 
optimal decision. 
There are at least three possible predictions one could 
make about how judgments of Angie’s responsibility for 
the outcome would vary as a function of the 
counterfactual alternatives that Angie forsook. 
First, according to the Counterfactual Stability view, 
counterfactual alternatives are irrelevant to computing 
causal responsibility in situations like Angie’s. This 
seems plausible, since PACT is fixed across all conditions 
at 50%, and the likelihood of goal completion does not 
depend on the efficacy of the alternative. Moreover, it is 
stipulated in the vignette that the agent achieves her goal, 
eliminating uncertainty about the  outcome. This result 
would be obtained if people are permissive of suboptimal 
decision-making when computing causal responsibility. In 
actual decision-making practice, after all, computational 
limitations prevent us from analyzing every possible 
course of action, so we often settle for an option that is 
satisfactory even if not optimal (Simon, 1956). 
Second, according to the Difference-Making view, 
judgments of responsibility are a linear function of the 
difference made by the actual choice, relative to the 
alternative choice.  On this view, responsibility judgments 
would be proportional to [PACT − PALT], known as ∆P in 
the causal learning literature. On this view, one is most 
responsible for an outcome when the quality of the 
alternative options is very low, because the choice made a 
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large difference, while one is viewed as less responsible 
as the size of this gap decreases. For suboptimal choices 
(i.e., when ∆P < 0), one’s responsibility could further 
decrease (or be viewed as preventive) as the forsaken 
alternatives become increasingly efficacious and ∆P 
becomes increasingly negative. Though prior research on 
causal attribution (e.g., Cheng & Novick, 1992; Spellman, 
1997) does not directly predict this result, this pattern 
would be most consistent with those previous findings. 
Finally, according to the Optimality view, judgments of 
responsibility would be higher for optimal decisions than 
for suboptimal decisions, without consideration for how 
much better that decision is, compared to its alternatives. 
As we know humans to be satisficers and heuristic 
decision-makers, it may seem unlikely on the surface that 
we should require optimal behavior from others when 
assigning causal responsibility. However, theoretical 
considerations make this view seem less far-fetched. 
Dennett (1987; see also Davidson, 1967) proposed that 
mental state inferences can often be accomplished by 
invoking a well-formedness rule called the Principle of 
Rationality. Just as we can solve the equation ‘X + Y = Z’ 
if given the values of two of the three variables, so can we 
make inferences about agents’ actions, goals, and 
situational constraints by using the principle that agents 
act rationally to satisfy their goals, given situational 
constraints. These inputs to the rationality ‘formula’ can 
be either states of the world (when reasoning 
teleologically), or mental states (i.e., beliefs, desires, and 
intentions, when reasoning mentalistically). In either case, 
the Principle of Rationality produces a unique prediction 
for one element given the other two, just as the facts of 
arithmetic yield a unique solution for ‘2 + Y = 5’. Actions 
conforming to the Principle of Rationality are optimal, 
relative to the agent’s goals and situational constraints. 
Previous research has shown that both adults and 
infants often make inferences afforded by the Principle of 
Rationality. In a series of experiments using a violation-
of-expectation paradigm, Csibra et al. (1999) presented 
young infants with simple visual displays of geometric 
figures. The infants successfully used teleological 
constraints to predict these figures’ actions from their 
goals and situational constraints. More recently, Baker, 
Saxe, and Tenenbaum (2009) developed a computational 
model to capture adults’ inferences about goals from a 
display of the agent’s movements in a simple maze. 
The Principle of Rationality could lead people to 
discount the causal efficacy of suboptimal decision-
makers in two ways. First, because actions are assumed to 
follow the Principle of Rationality, apparently suboptimal 
actions are often reinterpreted as optimal actions under 
different assumptions—for example, that the agent was 
acting under a different goal, or that the agent’s beliefs 
were incomplete or erroneous (Baker et al., 2009; 
Buchsbaum et al., 2011). Although the action is optimal 
under such a reinterpretation, the assumptions made about 
the agent (such as ignorance) to rationalize the action may 
undermine the agent’s perceived causal role in producing 
the outcome. Second, Csibra et al. (1999) have suggested 
that conformity to the Principle of Rationality is used as a 
principle for determining which entities are treated as 
agents, that is, as subject to folk-psychological principles. 
A decreased belief in the decision-maker’s status as an 
agent could lead to a decreased attribution of causation. 
Indeed, such reasoning may not be restricted only to 
human agents. Kelemen and Rosset (2009) found that 
even adults apply teleological principles ‘promiscuously’ 
to inanimate objects. If people use efficiency cues to 
classify entities as agents, they may assign greater causal 
responsibility for objects that fulfill their causal 
affordances in the most efficient manner. 
If the Optimality view is correct, responsibility 
judgments would be higher when PACT > PALT (an optimal 
choice) than when PACT < PALT (a suboptimal choice). 
However,  the size of [PACT − PALT] would not affect 
judgments, since optimality is a qualitative property of a 
choice and does not depend on the magnitude of this 
difference. This view does not make a specific prediction 
about judgments when PACT = PALT, because there is no 
uniquely optimal choice in such situations. 
Three experiments distinguished among these 
possibilities. First, we examined whether an agent’s 
perceived responsibility (Experiment 1A) or causal 
contribution (Experiment 1B) for the outcome of a 
decision depends on the efficacy of an alternative, 
forsaken option. Second, we replicated and extended 
these findings using situations in which agents decide 
among three options (Experiment 2A) or in which the 
base rate of the outcome is specified (Experiment 2B), 
ruling out an alternative interpretation of Experiment 1. 
Finally, we explored the possibility that optimality 
constraints are used in assessing causation more 
generally, even for inanimate causes (Experiment 3). 
Experiments 1A and 1B 
In Experiment 1, we examined whether the predictions of 
the Counterfactual Stability, Difference-Making, or 
Optimality view best capture judgments about vignettes 
such as those presented in the introduction. Additionally, 
to assess the consistency of these effects across measures, 
we included questions both about responsibility (in 
Experiment 1A) and about causation (in Experiment 1B). 
Method 
Participants Fifty participants (56% female) were 
recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk to participate in 
Experiment 1A, and a different group of 50 participants 
(44% female) to participate in Experiment 1B. 
Materials and Procedure Participants read five vignettes 
similar to the text given above, with five different cover 
stories. In these vignettes, PACT was fixed at 50%, while  
PALT was varied across cover stories (at 10%, 30%, 50%, 
70%, and 90%) using a Latin square. The corresponding 
values of ∆P (PACT − PALT) are thus 40%, 20%, 0%, 
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−20%, and −40%, respectively. Participants were asked to 
rate their agreement with either a responsibility statement 
(e.g., “Angie is responsible for the flowers turning red”) 
in Experiment 1A, or with a causal statement (“Angie 
caused the flowers to turn red”) in Experiment 1B, on an 
11-point scale (0: ‘disagree’; 5: ‘neither agree nor 
disagree’; 10: ‘agree’).  Manipulation check questions 
were included in this and all subsequent studies to 
monitor comprehension of the vignettes; however, these 
questions are not discussed further because no 
participants were eliminated from the analysis for these or 
any subsequent experiments. 
Results 
As shown in Table 1, judgments of responsibility and 
causation were higher when PACT > PALT than when PACT 
< PALT, while judgments were intermediate when PACT = 
PALT. Yet, the magnitude of the difference between PACT 
and PALT had no effect on judgments beyond the direction 
of the difference, consistent with the Optimality view. 
This pattern was confirmed with a mixed-model 
ANOVA on judgments, with PALT (10%, 30%, 50%, 70%, 
or 90%) as a within-subjects factor, and Experiment 
(responsibility question or causal question) as a between-
subjects factor. This revealed a significant main effect of 
PALT, F(4,392) = 13.97, MSE = 3.34, p < .001, ηp2 = .13, 
and a main effect of Experiment, F(1,98) = 10.54, MSE = 
15.41, p = .002, ηp2 = .10, with responsibility ratings 
higher overall than causal ratings (M = 6.09, SD = 1.67 
vs. M = 4.95, SD = 1.83). This main effect may have 
occurred because the word ‘cause’ triggered a 
deterministic causal concept at odds with the probabilistic 
character of the decision problem. There was no 
interaction between PALT and Experiment, F(4,392) = 
0.87, MSE = 3.34, p = .48, ηp2 < .01, indicating no reliable 
difference in the effect of PALT between experiments. 
To explore the main effect of PALT, pairwise planned 
comparisons were conducted on adjacent PALT conditions 
(means from the combined experiments are presented in 
the bottom row of Table 1). The 10% and 30% conditions 
did not differ, t(99) = 1.09, SEM = 0.21, p = .28, d = 0.11, 
nor did the 70% and 90% conditions, t(99) = −0.21, SEM 
= 0.24, p = .84, d = −0.02. However, the 50% condition 
differed significantly from both the 30% condition, t(99) 
= −3.13, SEM = 0.25, p = .002, d = −0.31, and the 70% 
condition, t(99) = 2.22, SEM = 0.21, p = .029, d = 0.22. 
 
Table 1: Results of Experiment 1 (SDs in parentheses). 
 
PALT 10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 
Exp. 1A 6.74 
(2.24) 
6.60 
(2.10) 
5.82 
(2.35) 
5.68 
(2.34) 
5.60 
(2.49) 
 
Exp. 1B 5.96 
(2.34) 
5.64 
(2.29) 
4.84 
(2.47) 
4.06 
(2.73) 
4.24 
(2.58) 
 
Mean 6.35 
(2.31) 
6.12 
(2.24) 
5.33 
(2.45) 
4.87 
(2.66) 
4.92 
(2.61) 
Discussion 
These results are most consistent with the Optimality 
view. Although there was an effect of PALT on 
responsibility ratings, this occurred only because 
judgments were dependent on the sign of ∆P: Judgments 
were higher when PACT > PALT than when PACT = PALT, 
and higher when PACT = PALT than when PACT < PALT, but 
the magnitude of ∆P did not affect judgments. This 
finding cannot be explained by either the Counterfactual 
Stability view, according to which responsibility 
judgments would be invariant over different values of 
PALT, or by the Difference-Making view, according to 
which responsibility judgments would be proportional to 
∆P (PACT − PALT). Moreover, the lack of magnitude-
dependence held for both attributions of responsibility 
and of causation, indicating that these results are not  due 
to idiosyncratic properties of either phrasing. 
Although the Counterfactual Stability and Difference-
Making views cannot explain the results of Experiment 1, 
these results do not uniquely entail the Optimality view, 
because participants could have made these responses on 
the basis of whether ∆P > 0. In more complex decision 
problems, it is possible for multiple options to have 
positive ∆P, yet for only one option to be uniquely 
optimal. Experiment 2 investigated whether people would 
still be sensitive to optimality in more complex scenarios. 
Experiments 2A and 2B 
To examine whether the response pattern in Experiment 1 
was based on optimality or simply on whether ∆P > 0, 
Experiment 2 used vignettes in which agents faced three 
choices, of which (A) had a low probability of leading to 
the goal, (B) had a moderate probability of leading to the 
goal, and (C) had the highest probability of leading to the 
goal. Thus, C is the optimal choice, but both B and C have 
positive ∆P relative to A. If judgments are based on 
optimality, then an agent choosing C should be rated more 
responsible than an agent choosing B, since C is optimal 
but A and B are not. However, if people are merely 
sensitive to ∆P being positive, they should rate agents 
choosing B and C equally highly, since ∆P > 0 for both. 
Experiment 2 employed two different framings of the 
“least optimal” alternative. In Experiment 2A, all three 
options were described as alternative choices with varying 
probabilities of success. In Experiment 2B, the “least 
optimal” alternative was described as a base rate—the 
probability of the goal occurring in the absence of any 
action. This second phrasing makes the fact that ∆P > 0 
for both of the other alternatives more salient, providing a 
stronger test against the Optimality hypothesis. 
Method 
Participants One hundred participants (52% female) 
were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk to 
participate in Experiment 2A, and a different group of 100 
participants (49% female) participated in Experiment 2B. 
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Each experiment was conducted as part of a session that 
included additional experiments not reported here; the 
order of the experiments was counterbalanced. 
Materials and Procedure In Experiment 2A, participants 
read two vignettes from Experiment 1, modified to read: 
Angie has a shrub, and wants the shrub’s flowers to 
turn red. She is thinking about applying a fertilizer, 
and has three options: 
If she applies Formula LPN, there is a 10% chance 
that the flowers will turn red. 
If she applies Formula PTY, there is a 50% chance 
that the flowers will turn red. 
If she applies Formula NRW, there is a [30/70]% 
chance that the flowers will turn red. 
Angie chooses Formula PTY, and the flowers turn red. 
For Experiment 2B, the phrase “if she applies Formula 
LPN” was replaced by the phrase “if she applies nothing,” 
to make the 10% base rate more salient. Whether Formula 
NRW had a 30% or 70% chance of leading to the goal 
(PALT) was manipulated within-subjects (in the former 
case, the actual choice was optimal, while in the latter 
case, the actual choice was suboptimal), with the 
assignment of PALT to vignette counterbalanced. 
Participants rated the agent’s responsibility for the 
outcome on the same 11-point scale as Experiment 1A. 
Results and Discussion 
As shown in Figure 1, agents were viewed as less 
responsible when their choice was suboptimal, whether 
the “least optimal” option was described as an alternative 
(Experiment 2A) or as a base rate (Experiment 2B). This 
occurred even though ∆P was positive for both choices. 
An ANOVA was conducted on responsibility 
judgments, with PALT (30% or 70%) as a within-subjects 
factor and Experiment (2A or 2B) as a between-subjects 
factor. There was a main effect of PALT, F(1,198) = 18.57, 
MSE = 1.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .09, with responsibility rated 
higher when PALT = 30% (M = 6.83, SD = 2.01) than 
when PALT = 70% (M = 6.24, SD = 2.14). Thus, 
responsibility ratings were higher for optimal decisions. 
There was also a main effect of Experiment, F(1,198) = 
12.57, MSE = 6.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .06, with judgments 
higher in Experiment 2B (M = 6.98, SD = 1.53) than in 
Experiment 2A (M = 6.09, SD = 2.01). This may have 
occurred because Experiment 2B described the least 
effective option as an omission rather than as an action, 
creating a qualitative difference among the options. 
However, there was no interaction between Experiment 
and PALT, F(1,198) = 0.30, MSE = 1.91, p = .59, ηp2 < .01. 
Although the Difference-Making account would make 
the same predictions as the Optimality account for these 
cases, the results of Experiment 2 show that the responses 
in Experiment 1 are unlikely to have been based merely 
on considerations of whether ∆P > 0, since this was the 
case for both the optimal and the suboptimal case in 
Experiment 2. The Optimality view is the only account 
that is consistent with the results of both experiments. 
 
 
Figure 1: Mean responsibility judgments (Experiment 2) 
and causal judgments (Experiment 3) on 11-point scales. 
Experiment 3 
One potential explanation for the results of Experiments 1 
and 2 is that participants were reinterpreting apparently 
suboptimal actions as guided by a different set of 
assumptions about the agent’s knowledge or goals (e.g., 
Baker et al., 2009; Buchsbaum et al., 2011). Angie’s 
objectively suboptimal decision to use Formula PTY may 
have led participants to view her as ignorant of the choice 
situation, or as having some other goal in mind other than 
making the flowers turn red, and participants may have 
accordingly downgraded her responsibility. 
Another possibility, however, is that these results 
reflect principles used to designate entities as subject to 
our folk-psychological theorizing in the first place. Csibra 
et al. (1999) suggested that the Principle of Rationality is 
used for this purpose; indeed, efficiency may even be 
detected at the perceptual level (Gao & Scholl, 2011). If 
individuals failing to behave optimally are not 
conceptualized as agents to the same extent as those 
behaving optimally, this could lead people to discount 
their role in causally producing the outcome. 
If our earlier effects were obtained at least in part 
because optimality is used as a principle for designating 
agents, optimality considerations might be used more 
generally in causal reasoning, outside the social realm, 
because people may reason about efficient causes as 
though they were endowed with agent-like properties. 
This prediction, while counterintuitive, is bolstered by 
findings of ‘promiscuous’ teleological reasoning 
(Kelemen & Rosset, 2009), with children and even adults 
under time pressure treating natural kinds as though they 
were artifacts endowed with purposes. Experiment 3 
examined this prediction by testing whether  people treat 
event types as more causal when they lead optimally to 
their effect, relative to other possible causes. 
Method 
Participants One hundred participants (44% female) 
were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk to 
participate in Experiment 3. This experiment was 
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conducted as part of a session that included an additional 
experiment not reported here; the order of the experiments 
was counterbalanced. 
Materials and Procedure Participants read two vignettes 
adapted from Experiment 2B so that they no longer 
referred to a choice made by a human agent, but instead to 
the probability of an effect occurring given two different 
(non-human) causes: 
There is a certain shrub that has flowers which 
sometimes turn red. There are two brands of 
fertilizer: Formula PTY and Formula NRW. 
When nothing is applied, there is a 10% chance that 
the flowers turn red. 
When Formula PTY is applied, there is a 50% chance 
that the flowers turn red. 
When Formula NRW is applied, there is a [30/70]% 
chance that the flowers turn red. 
Each participant was then asked to what extent they 
agreed with the statement that “Formula PTY causes the 
flowers to turn red” on the same 11-point scale used in 
previous experiments. In both conditions, participants 
judged the strength of a cause with 50% efficacy (i.e., 
PACT = 50%), while the efficacy of the other cause (PALT = 
30% or PALT = 70%) was manipulated within-subjects and 
counterbalanced with vignette. 
Results and Discussion 
As shown in Figure 1, Formula PTY was judged more 
causal when it was optimal than when it was suboptimal, 
even though it always had a 50% chance of leading to the 
effect. A paired-sample t-test revealed that causal ratings 
were higher in the PALT = 30% condition (M = 6.58, SD= 
1.67) than in the PALT = 70% condition (M = 6.00, SD = 
1.72), t(99) = 4.50, SEM = 0.13, p < .001, d = 0.45. 
This result suggests that the mechanism underlying the 
optimality effect in lay decision theory is not specific to 
human agents, but can be extended ‘promiscuously’ to 
other entities, with people discounting a cause’s efficacy 
in the face of a superior alternative cause. 
One concern about this result might be potential scale 
or contrast effects. For example, suppose that participants 
implicitly judge each cause in each vignette (including the 
alternative cause that was not asked about), and always 
give the ‘best’ cause for each vignette the same rating. 
Then, a participant in the optimal condition might have 
assigned the better (actual) cause a rating of ‘7’ and 
implicitly assigned the worse (alternative) cause a rating 
of ‘5’, and in the suboptimal condition implicitly assigned 
the better (alternative) cause a rating of ‘7’ and the worse 
(actual) cause a rating of ‘5’, leading to our effect. 
Similarly, a contrast effect could have occurred if the 
psychological weight of PACT differed between conditions. 
PACT (50%) could have felt like a larger magnitude when 
compared to PALT = 30% than to PALT = 70%, leading to 
higher ratings in the optimal condition. 
Although these possibilities can only be ruled out 
definitively with future study, our within-subjects design 
renders these explanations unlikely. The vignettes were 
read and judged consecutively, which both calls attention 
to the consistency of PACT across conditions, and creates 
pressure to give identical responses across conditions. 
Nonetheless, converging evidence from other tasks will 
be of use in ruling out these possibilities more directly. 
The present result should be distinguished from the 
superficially similar phenomena of discounting (e.g., 
Khemlani & Oppenheimer, 2011) and cue competition 
(e.g., Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992). Discounting occurs 
when one has a prior causal schema in which two causes 
(e.g., Formulas PTY and NRW) are each sufficient for an 
effect (the flowers turning red). If one cause (Formula 
NRW) is known to occur on some particular occasion, 
this makes the other cause (Formula PTY) less likely to 
be present on that occasion, because the known presence 
of Formula NRW “explains away” the effect and removes 
any reason to posit Formula PTY. Thus, the discounting 
phenomenon involves prior knowledge of causal types 
influencing subsequent inferences about causal tokens. 
In the related phenomenon of cue competition, token-
level observational data affect subsequent formation of 
type-causal schemas. For example, in backward blocking, 
two candidate causes are first paired with the effect (i.e., 
Formulas PTY and NRW are both applied for several 
trials on which the flowers turn red), then one of the 
candidates alone is paired with the effect (i.e., only 
Formula PTY is applied for several trials on which the 
flowers turn red). Observing that the alternative cue 
(Formula PTY) produces the effect by itself reduces the 
belief that Formula NRW causes the effect in general. 
However, the logics underlying these phenomena do 
not apply to our experimental situation. The input to the 
discounting process is type-causal schemas, and the 
output token-causal inferences; the input to cue 
competition is token-causal observations, and the output 
type-causal schemas. In our task, in contrast, participants 
made type-causal judgments from knowledge about 
statistical relationships at the type level. Thus, the present 
phenomenon is conceptually distinct. 
Although Experiment 3 suggests that the optimality 
effect in lay decision theory occurs at least in part because 
conformity to the Principle of Rationality is used to 
designate entities as subject to folk-psychological 
principles, this does not preclude the possibility that some 
participants in Experiments 1 and 2 were additionally re-
interpreting the agents’ actions as optimal under a 
different set of assumptions. Nonetheless, Experiment 3 
shows that re-interpretation cannot be a full explanation. 
Indeed, the effect in Experiment 3, which cannot not be 
explained in terms of re-interpretation, was of similar 
magnitude to that in Experiment 2. 
General Discussion 
The present studies examined whether optimality is used 
as a cue for assigning causal responsibility. In Experiment 
1, agents were judged more responsible for, and more 
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causal in, producing an outcome when their decision was 
the optimal choice for obtaining the outcome, but the 
magnitude of the difference between the efficacy of the 
optimal and suboptimal choices did not affect judgments. 
Experiment 2 showed that perceived responsibility is 
greater when a decision is optimal than when suboptimal, 
even when the suboptimal option is superior to a worst 
option or to the base rate of the outcome. Finally, 
Experiment 3 demonstrated an optimality effect in 
reasoning about causation for inanimate causes, 
suggesting that the optimality effect occurs at least in part 
because entities acting optimally are more likely to be 
designated as agents subject to our folk psychology. 
Our results suggest several potentially promising 
avenues for future research. We are seldom confronted in 
real life with decisions for which we know the exact 
probabilities, more often entertaining a range of 
probabilities as potentially valid (Levi, 1985). A more 
ecologically valid test of our optimality hypothesis would 
specify realistic decision alternatives for which 
participants had a range of prior beliefs about the efficacy 
for achieving an outcome, rather than a single probability 
value. We chose to instead specify the probabilities so as 
to maximize experimental control. However, replicating 
the current results with more naturalistic stimuli would 
both enhance the generality of our findings and allow for 
exploration of boundary conditions. 
Little appears to be known concerning folk beliefs 
about decision-making, what we term lay decision theory. 
In addition to shedding light on our theory of mind 
abilities, understanding the principles of lay decision 
theory may have practical implications for behavioral 
game theory, in which people must model others’ 
behavior in order to make their own decisions. The 
present research addresses only a small fraction of the 
questions that might be asked: for example, how these 
beliefs are used in explaining and predicting behavior, 
whether (and when) people conceptualize decisions in 
terms of mental states or as states of the world (i.e., with 
mentalistic or teleological representations), how people 
conceptualize more complex decision problems in which 
multiple goals must be balanced against one another, and 
whether optimality constraints are applied equally to our 
own behavior as to the behavior of others. We are 
currently conducting research to probe these questions. 
Conclusion 
Rationality constraints are commonplace heuristics for 
making inferences about human actions. The present 
research shows that such constraints also play a role in the 
evaluation of decisions, affecting how causal 
responsibility is assigned for an outcome. 
As suboptimal decision-makers ourselves, it may 
appear hypocritical for us to hold others less responsible 
for the outcomes of their decisions when they decide 
suboptimally. Yet, we may have little choice—our 
rationality is, after all, bounded. 
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